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ABSTRACT:   
 
This thesis examines the historical development of principal-agent theory as it has 
been applied to municipal management, and how this theory helps us explain the high 
attrition rate in the city management profession.    Current and past academic dialogue 
on the subject is discussed and various explanations for low city management tenure are 
explored.  This research is based on data from a survey sent to 185 city managers in the 
state of Oklahoma, seeking answers from managers in the profession as to the cause of 
low city manager tenure. The findings suggest that principal-agent theory, as it has been 
applied to the manager-council local government plan, is insufficient to meet the needs of 
effective governing.  A new organizational plan is proposed, based on adaptations of an 





Bent over a yellow 1969 Camaro Super Sport, David Johnson said he much 
preferred restoring muscle cars to solving his neighbors' utility and garbage woes as 
Tecumseh's city manager. ''It's too political,'' said Mr. Johnson, 36, a former state 
inspector who quit City Hall in December after voters elected a new mayor and council 
members he regarded as hostile.  Add Tecumseh, a central Oklahoma community of 
6,490, to the list of municipalities around the country searching for a city manager 
(Blumenthal, January 11, 2007).  
The scenario mentioned above is becoming an all-too familiar issue for the city 
management profession, and it is threatening the future of this vital occupation.  Of 
particular significance is the fact that, although intense political pressures are often 
present, the position of city manager was created to provide a community with a 
managing professional unbiased by local politics.  The philosophy of city management 
that has developed to address for this tension owes its birth to the adaptation of principal-
agent theory to the public arena.   
Principal-agent theory suggests a hierarchical or superior-subordinate relationship 
between the principal and the agent. The theory centers on how the principal can 
maintain control over the agent in an efficient manner (White, 1985). In the context of 
political-bureaucratic relations, the theory posits that elected officials—the principals—
have political incentives to control public agencies and public employees—their agents. 
As in other theories of political control, public administrator agents are assumed to be 
accountable to their elected principals (Selden, Brewer and Brudney, 1999). 
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 Frequently however, city managers are finding themselves immersed in political 
turmoil.  In some instances, city managers have lost their jobs over political malfeasance 
perpetrated by elected mayors or city council members within the community (Banfield 
and Wilson, 1963, DeHoog and Whitaker, 1990). The ethical injustices of such an 
occurrence are clear and the consequences to the profession left in the wake of this type 
of political turmoil are beginning to take form.   
Recent attention has been given to this problem by Donald E. Klingner, John 
Nalbandian, and Barbara S. Romzek, public administration scholars from the University 
of Colorado and the University of Kansas.  These authors provide a basic outline of the 
expectations of elected officials and staff administrators in city governments; and how 
politics affects those expectations: 
 
If we focus for an example on an urban setting and only on the political 
and administrative arenas and more specifically on council-staff relations, there 
are four sets of expectations and obligations that chief administrative officers 
must work with. First, there are the expectations that elected officials have of staff 
members.  Second, there are the obligations to staff members that elected officials 
are willing to accept to enhance the probability that staff members will fulfill the 
elected body’s expectations. Third, there are the expectations that staff members 
have of the governing body. And last, there are the obligations that staff members 
are willing to undertake to enhance the probability that the governing body will 
fulfill staff members’ expectations. The chief administrative officer’s role in a 
local government is to manage an ongoing process whereby these expectations 
and obligations are explored and resolved and then explored again and resolved 
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again and so on. In council-manager cities in particular, this is a common 
dynamic, and effective city managers have to be adept at it.  (Klingner, et al., 
2002). 
 
Klingner concedes, however, that the expectations of elected officials in a city 
government can at times be in conflict with standards of professional integrity that apply 
to the city manager position. Proper and ethical administration is sometimes thwarted by 
political pressures.  In a system that predicated upon the principal-agent dichotomy, the 
city manager is all too often finding that the system that created her job is the very system 
that is preventing her from doing it (Klingner, et al., 2001). 
Considering the conflicting pressures that characterize the profession, it may not 
be surprising that fewer candidates are applying for city management positions, (Sheehan, 
2001; Stein, 1990).  In the state of Oklahoma for example, the Oklahoma Municipal 
recently discovered that there are currently over 60 vacancies for these positions (Dean, 
2007).  That is, over 60 communities in Oklahoma are without professional city 
administrators in government structures which require the position to function effectively.  
All parties involved in this debate, such as the Oklahoma Municipal League and the City 
Managers Association, and even city managers themselves have their opinions as to what 
or who is to blame for the insufficient level of interest in the occupational field.   
The finger-pointing varies from a generation apprehensive of intense local 
political pressures, a growing body of disenfranchised candidates in the job pool who 
have seen the distractions that unions cause city managers via non-binding arbitration, 
too strict work experience criteria among communities for hiring new managers, a lack of 
city funding, and even a lack of salary competitiveness (Morgan & Watson, 1992; 
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Sheehan, 2001).  All of these opinions are valid, but the issues owe their birth to the 
design of the profession itself. 
The main source for all the problems mentioned above can perhaps be found in 
the manner in which principal-agent theory has been implemented in city governments.  
The present research examines this possibility from a variety of perspectives. What 
follows in the next section is an overview of the historical development of principal-agent 
theory as applied to municipal management, and a review of case studies demonstrating 
some weaknesses of this particular application of principal-agent theory.  Next, a research 
design incorporating a city manager survey allows for an examination of factors affecting 
city manager tenure.  Finally, an alternative to the employment of principal-agent theory, 




In recent decades academic study has not been quite as devoted to the municipal 
government in North America as it has been in the past.  Following the Progressive Era, 
there was a parting of ways between public administration and political science, and the 
academic field of city planning in America has been placed in a niche somewhere 
between the two academic disciplines (Banovetz, 1971).  This has led to a decrease in 
academic attention on the field.  
 Of course there are numerous not-for-profit organizations, such as the 
International City Management Association, who continue to do research on the status of 
this pivotal sector of American society, but the intense study of municipal management 
that once was, has not been seen since its developing years.  Today much academic 
interest in this field is devoted to international municipalities where the western 
experiment of capitalist-driven government is just taking root (Haruna, 2001; Okpala, 
1979; Roman, 1993; and Krannich, 1979).  True as it may be that the municipalities of 
countries outside of the United States are worthy of academic dialogue, it has also 
become necessary that the scholarly conversations of the Progressive Era begin once 
more about the city governments in the U.S. 
The creation of a city manager on the basis of principal-agent theory began during 
the Progressive era with the intention of developing and strengthening relationships 
between elected officials and professional administrators (Renner, 1990; Selden, et al., 
1999; Wright, 1969).  In 1913, Dayton, Ohio became the first city to actually implement 
the council-manager form of government with any success.  Owing to favorable 
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perceptions of the model’s performance in Dayton, its popularity became a widespread 
phenomenon (Shaw, et al., 1998).  The job of the city manager in this form of 
government was essentially outlined to include formulating policy on overall problems, 
preparing the budget, presenting it to the council and administering it when approved by 
the council, appointing and removing most of the principal department heads in city 
government, and forming extensive external relationships to deal with overall problems 
of city operations (Kraemer, 1973).   
One line of research in the field of public administration finds that throughout 
much of U.S. history, from the eighteenth to the end of the nineteenth century, it was 
common for administrative positions in American government to be filled by people who 
did not intend to make public service a career. Many administrators secured office in 
their respective positions through patronage systems, which dispensed public 
employment to the followers of winning candidates and political parties (Feiock and 
Stream, 1998).  
Turnover in these positions was commonplace for many bureaucrats because their 
jobs depended on the uncertain outcomes of elections (Svara, 1990). During the last part 
of the nineteenth century, the civil service at all levels of American government began to 
incorporate policies that assured job security for many employees and placed a priority 
on retaining expert and professional personnel. Early in the twentieth century, the 
importance of careerism among public servants was stressed by scholars who helped 
build the intellectual foundations of public administration (Weber, 1946). The municipal 
reform movement, however, promoted the institution of appointed, nonpartisan managers 
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to promote efficiency and consistency in local administration (Svara, 1998).  This 
included the city manager position. 
Concerns followed in the 1920s however, that the city manager role had too much 
control within a community.  As a result, the role of city manager was soon modified 
under more narrow definitions of control.  With these more narrow definitions, the city 
manager role was also more firmly established as a professional administrator separated 
from the politics of their community (Newell and Ammons, 1987; Selden, et al., 1999).  
It soon became apparent, however, that such a dichotomy was impossible in practice. 
Scholars observed that several problems arose out of the new guidelines for the 
city manager role.  In smaller communities, the city manager, being the professional 
administrator in the community, was often given even more authority than elected 
officials, laying out the budget for the community and creating policies for the 
community to follow the budget.  Such action rendered the city council and mayor 
virtually helpless to effect changes in the community as they saw fit (Miller, 2000; 
Selden, Brewer and Brudney, 1999).   
Recent academic inquiries on the subject have also discussed how the increase in 
authority for a city manager occurs.  In their most recent edition of Managing Urban 
America, municipal management scholars David R. Morgan and Robert E. England 
conclude that,  
despite its obvious popularity there are potential shortcomings to the council-
manager form.  The sharp distinction between policymaking and administration is 
unrealistic…the major potential limitation of the council-manager plan is its lack of 
formal provision for strong policy leadership.  The council is a group of equals, the 
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mayor is limited to a ceremonial role, and the manager presumably serves only in an 
advisory role.  Sometimes the mayor or one of the council members emerges as a policy 
leader, but more likely, the council will flounder about or turn to the manager, (Morgan 
and England, 1999, p. 69).   
 
When faced with such governing scenarios, city managers become inevitably 
intertwined with politics and the principal-agent dichotomy is laid aside.  As a result, if 
the residents of such communities want any changes in their town, are left to take it up 
with the city manager to do so. 
In other instances, the new role for city managers placed them under guidelines 
whereby they became less significant in their communities (Selden, Brewer and Brudney, 
1999; Stillman, 1974).  Limited to the role of being an employee under the mayor and 
city council, city managers were subject to the will of their employers, and if the 
aforementioned will was politically biased or corrupt, the city manager was also then 
forced to either submit to the politically motivated biases of their employers, or find 
employment elsewhere.  This not only placed the city manager in a position to once again 
be subject to town politics, but it also created another problem for the city management 
role as many city managers grew tired of the political drama and found another job 
(Watson and Hassett, 2003). 
This new problem plagues the city management profession today, and with such 
retention crises and turnover rates, it becomes necessary that this problem be addressed 
when evaluating principal-agent theory as applied to municipal management.  But just 
how long is the average tenure of a city manager and what examples can be found of 
issues such as those outlined above? 
 13
Morgan and England paint the best picture for the average tenure of a city 
manager when describing the people who currently fill the role in the United States.  
They write, “Local public managers are an elite group, one that is unusually 
homogeneous with respect to race, sex, education, and experience.  A 1989 ICMA survey 
finds that most are male (95 percent), white (99 percent), and married (89 percent).  The 
typical manager has served in his present position for 5.4 years and spent a total of 10.1 
years as a local government executive,” (Morgan and England, 1999).  In their more 
recent  addition of the same textbook, Morgan, England, and Pelissero write that manager 
tenure has now increased to 6.9 years, however this number is still low for a national 
average, and this study will demonstrate that manager tenure in Oklahoma is lower than 
either of the reported tenures for the U.S. (Morgan, England, and Pelissero, 2006; p. 90). 
Such findings are significant as it is possible that a lack of diversity has 
contributed to the problem (Nalbandian, 1999). However, the average age of city 
managers which Morgan and England did not address in their study of demographics, 
could be even more menacing.  As will be demonstrated, the profession is rich with 
employees nearing retirement age, while few prospective successors appear on the 
horizon.  Later this dynamic will be addressed more fully, but for now it is important to 
address the disturbingly low tenure of city managers. Considering the average tenure of a 
city manager, it is important to next examine some of the issues that are contributing to 
such low tenure. 
In Fort Oglethorpe, Tennessee, for example, a case of political bias gives insight 
to one of the factors affecting the overall nationwide dilemma regarding city manager 
retention.  In this instant, Paul Page, the City Manager in 2004 was fired by the City 
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Council of Fort Olgethorpe after being pressured by the Mayor (Judd Burkhart at the time) 
to find a City manager ‘he can control’(The Chattanoogan, January 2, 2002). Moreover, 
when City Manager Page was fired, no reason was given at the city meeting, and it has 
since been argued that the incident was a retaliatory measure without any justification or 
warrant (The Chattanoogan, January 2, 2002).   
At the time of the unannounced firing, Councilman Cobb was reported, in the 
community’s newspaper, to have said there was "a lynch mob mentality in Catoosa 
County." Cobb said the move was again throwing city government into turmoil (The 
Chattanoogan, January 2, 2002).  This example illustrates how deficient principal-agent 
theory can be in terms of its presumption of a politically-neutral actor in municipal 
management. Moreover, and perhaps most strikingly, this case demonstrates the danger 
in unqualified citizens providing leadership in a community; their inexperience has the 
tendency to allow personal biases and local politics to greatly inhibit the progress of a 
community. 
 Finally, and most disturbingly, Bob Montgomery, staff writer for “The Daily 
Advance,” the news source for Elizabeth City, North Carolina, provides an example of an 
Assistant City Manager recently being fired from his job based on the color of his skin.  
The incident occurred in September of 2003, when Reggie Goodson, the Assistant City 
Manager at the time, was fired without warning by the City Manager after being placed 
under intense pressure by a majority-white City Council (Montgomery, 2006).    
Councilwoman Anita Hummer, who wasn’t on the City Council when Goodson 
was fired, however was active in Elizabeth City politics, and commented on that, “it was 
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clear that race was a factor in the decision.  I think it was pretty obvious what it was — 
(and that it happened) along racial lines” (Montgomery, 2006).  Currently Goodson, now 
an attorney, is suing Elizabeth City and many of the municipal officials at the time for the 
unjust firing. 
Researchers Gordon P. Whitaker and Ruth Hoogland DeHoog addressed the 
problem of conflict affecting manager turnover in their research encompassing city 
managers in Florida.  Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) found that conflict does occur in 
council-manager cities and is a frequent cause of managerial turnover.  Through their 
extensive research, Whitaker and DeHoog demonstrate that in communities of high 
conflict, which were numerous in their study, city managers were typically fired or forced 
to resign.  Additionally, their research reveals that when a city manager was forced to 
resign or fired, they most often sought work in the private sector; never returning to work 
in the city management profession (Whitaker and DeHoog, 1991). 
In their important study, Whitaker and DeHoog further demonstrated how 
detrimental such conflict can be to a community, as well as some of the causes reported 
by city managers they surveyed.  Conclusively, they explained: 
Conflict in city governance can be harmful.  Council members or managers who 
pursue selfish, personal objectives may divert city resources or delay city action at the 
expense of public well being.  Even conflict over what constitutes good public policy 
harms the community if it prevents action on pressing public problems or results in the 
departure of an effective city manager.  Similarly, the firing of competent, public-spirited 
managers because they refuse to violate laws or professional ethics, or because of petty 
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jealousies, costs the city the effective executive leadership which that manager provide 
(Whitaker and DeHoog, 1991). 
Since the advent of principal-agent theory’s particular application to municipal 
management via the manager-council vehicle, much academic attention has been paid to 
the relationship between mayors and their managers.  As Morgan and England write, 
initially the mayor position was intended to have a modest role in local government 
(Morgan and England, 1999).  But just as is the case with the goals of principal-agent 
theory in municipalities, the intentions of the creators of the mayor role were overly 
ambitious.  In their academic work, Managing Urban America, Morgan and England 
write: 
Even in many smaller communities mayors have been known to exercise 
considerable influence on a host of municipal affairs.  In fact, a classic study of several 
small communities in Florida published in the 1960s revealed that an activist mayor, 
especially one popularly elected, can pose a threat to a manager’s tenure.  More recent 
research by Gordon Whitaker and Ruth Hoogland DeHoog confirms this finding.  In 
addition, they aver that contrary to some findings, conflict is a frequent cause for 
turnover among city managers (Morgan and England, 1999, p.101). 
It is also significant to note the research that exists which suggests that city 
managers often move from one community to another in order to advance in his or her 
career (Kaatz, 1996; Kaatz et al., 1999). George Floro, noted academician in the field of 
city management, discussed this point (Floro, 1955).  In Floro’s work, poor retention 
among city managers could be explained not by the injustices inflicted upon their career 
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by political malfeasance, as suggested in other research, but by the professional’s own 
design.  However, even if this is the reason why the tenure for city managers is so low in 
communities, the fact does not speak well for the profession and can have negative 
results for the communities involved.  Floro concedes to this in his article when he writes,  
“Movement not only has consequences for careers; it has consequences as 
well for the occupational group and the city managers social movement.  Thus a 
manager may be judged to hurt himself, hurt the profession, and fail to provide 
the proper service to the city if, for example, he moves to soon or stays too long.  
For a city manager to move, not only is his reputation among colleagues at stake 
but the reputation for the manager’s city also enters into the colleague judgments 
of responsible behavior.  A city with rapid turnover of managers for example, is a 
‘bad’ manager city or a ‘hot spot,’ (Floro, 1955). 
Recognizing the detrimental effects a city manager’s short tenure can have on a 
community as well as the profession and the professional, even those which have been 
brought about by the professional’s own invention, the organizational framework to 
blame for permitting such occupational irresponsibility, principal-agent theory as it has 
been implemented in the municipal profession, remains in question as a viable approach 
to municipal management (Kaatz, 1999; Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001). 
As mentioned, much attention on local governments has shifted from the U.S. to 
countries still in developing stages.  Some of these countries have taken from the 
experiences of local government in America, and have adapted to fit their own demands 
and national governing bodies.  One such example comes from England.  There in 2000, 
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Parliament passed a piece of legislation known as The Local Government Act of 2000. 
Simply stated, this Act placed British communities under restriction to choose from 
among 3 forms of government-a leader elected by the city council with a cabinet of 
executive members, a directly elected mayor with a cabinet, or a directly elected mayor 
with an appointed manager (Fenwick et al., 2006).   
This appears to be a recreation of America’s own principal-agent dichotomy with 
councils and managers, but there is a difference.  In Britain now, the mayor position has 
more authority than the council.  As a result, political quarrels are less frequent obstacles 
to effective local governing.  The problem with this however, is that the mayor is a 
political figure, and the political figure now has control of the budget.  Such a system is 
open to the same problems of professional malfeasance, political turmoil, etc. that local 
governments in America are facing as the city management profession struggles to 
survive. 
Another example has been cited in Thailand, where intergovernmental relations 
are heavily political.  These political relations between the levels of government 
determine who gets what, when, and how; they center on the competition for power, 
influence, and authority; and, they generate and resolve conflicts over important group 
and societal values (Krannich, 1979).  Local governments in Thailand at the time of 
Krannich’s research were severely restricted in autonomy because of strict legal 
restrictions, and are placed under direct administrative control of a provincial governor.  
In Thailand, administrators remain longer in communities, thus providing more stability, 
but the governing system greatly contradicts western concepts of democracy and self-
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government (Krannich, 1979).  In such a system as this, the community loses all ability to 
govern itself.  Therefore this cannot stand as a viable alternative to the manager-council 
dichotomy in the U.S. 
There was a period before World War II, in which scholars in the field of public 
administration were looking to Germany for answers to the principal-agent problem in 
local governments.  One of these scholars was Woodrow Wilson.  In his landmark essay, 
The Study of Administration, Wilson mentions the local administrator of municipalities in 
several countries.  One of these was Germany.  It was Wilson’s belief that Germany had 
some concepts worth adopting in American local government to promote efficiency 
(Wilson, 1887).  However, part of what made the administration of local governments so 
effective in Germany was that the local bureaucrat did not work to serve the people, but 
the authority of a superior (Wilson, 1887).  Wilson sought to inspire the creation of a 
hybrid government that allowed a local administrator to serve both a superior authority 
and the public.  According to public administration scholars during the early twentieth 
century, the manager-council form of government was supposed to be the answer, but it 
gave the public too much control over the administrator.  This could be yet another 
explanation for the current low tenure in the city management profession. 
Other countries have received recent academic attention on the subject of creating 
an effective local government.  One of these is Nigeria, which has a whole new approach 
to capitalist-driven local government that is taking root; and with much success.  Town 
planning for the country has become more of a state government level activity.  A noted 
scholar on city governments outside of the U.S., Donatus C. I. Okpala, writes: 
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Specific arrangements for carrying out city planning in Nigeria by state level 
governments vary slightly from state to state.  In some, town planning is a function of one 
of the state ministries and there is usually a chief town planning officer for each state 
who is charged with the responsibilities for the planning of every city within that state.  
Small town planning offices are set up in the major cities and towns of the state for 
routine building plan approvals and some data collection.  The real decision making and 
drawing up of city plans for any city in the state is done in the state capital (Okpala, 
1979). 
Granted, Nigeria was a developing country at the time of Okpala’s obersvations, 
and under this system, many cities who are in need of a full-time manager, even cities 
with very large populations, receive no planning attention at all from the state (Okpala, 
1979).  Such a model would not be sufficient for the more developed cities that make up 
the United States, but Nigeria’s plan is worth mentioning; as the country’s planners do 
have higher tenure, perhaps some aspects of the model can be applied to local 
government in America. 
There are some who argue that one cause for much of the political turmoil that 
has resulted in low city manager tenure is due to ward representation within communities 
that have adopted that particular form of government.  It is true that many communities 
have now moved away from the ward structure in their local government because of 
discontent with the government form.  An early discussion of the effects of ward politics 
suggests how this structure can detrimentally affect city management, and how the 
commission structure offers some advantages: 
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…The ever increasing number of cities that are turning to [commission form of 
government] for relief from unbearable municipal conditions and the apparently entire 
lack of inclination on the part of the cities that have made the change to return to the old 
form are evidence enough that something worth while has been accomplished.  The 
substitution of one responsible body for two or more has undoubtedly increased both 
popular interest and popular control in the commission governed cities.  The abolition of 
the ward has helped to eliminate ward politics, (James, 1914; p. 602). 
In a commission form of municipal government however, more problems often 
result than in traditional ward structures, (James, 1914; DeSantis and Renner, 1993).  One 
problem is that the commission form of government replaces the city manager in most 
instances with a board of commissioners.  The commissioners are more of a financial 
strain to the city budget as it takes more money to hire a few commissioners than one city 
manager.  Moreover, even if wards are the root of the problem for city manager tenure, 
removing the ward structure within communities will in no way have an affect on 
geographic areas where city managers move frequently for the purpose of occupational 
advancement to a larger community with increased salary.  When developing a 
government to support the city manager position, it is important to protect the 
community’s interest as well (Linberry and Fowler, 1967).  However the presence of 
ward representation in local governments is worth looking into, which will be done later 
in this study. 
It has also been suggested that city managers are not paid according to their work 
load (Barber, 1988). Low tenure for city managers has been frequently explained in terms 
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of city managers leaving the municipal arena to take jobs with much more competitive 
pay, perhaps as a hospital manager or a non-profit executive (Miller, 2000).  However 
these claims are not wholly persuasive.  As one example, a Scout Executive, the 
Executive Director for a Council Service Center of the Boy Scouts of America earns a 
comparable salary, yet the position has a much higher tenure rate than the city manager 
tenure rate.   
Understanding and predicting manager turnover is not only important to the field 
of public management, it may also have implications for public policy. Management 
researchers argue that administrative turnover leads to inconsistent organizational 
outcomes (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1993). Within the field of public administration, 
scholars have assumed that administrative turnover is significant because it indicates a 
loss of both institutional memory and neutral competence (Heclo, 1977; Wilson, 1994; 
Hass and Wright, 1989; Lewis, 1991). 
Only recently has the policy and management consequences of turnover among 
local government managers been systematically identified. Empirical studies indicate 
turnover may affect privatization, capital planning, debt financing, and public-private 
economic development projects because they presuppose minimal transaction costs and 
lengthy time horizons on the part of local leaders (Clingermayer, 1995). 
In some instances, the professional norms of managers may conflict with the 
interests of elected officials (Frederickson, 1995). This expectation is consistent with 
Whitaker and DeHoog's (1991) finding that the presence of a popularly elected mayor is 
negatively associated with city manager tenure (Svara, 1998 and 1990; Booth, 1968). The 
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institutional character of councils also can have implications for tenure decisions. 
Electoral institutions shape the incentive structures of local representatives. City manager 
tenure may be shorter under district-based representation because the chances for 
political conflict and strong expression of parochial interests are greater in district 
elections than in at-large elections (Clingermayer and Feiock, 1995). 
In an important study on manager tenure, it should be noted, Richard Feiock and 
Christopher Stream did not find substantial support for the notion that political 
representation structures influence tenure. The authors additionally sought to discover, 
through a series of city manager surveys, if direct election of a mayor had a statistically 
significant effect on manager tenure, only to find that it did not (Feiock & Stream, 1998).  
Moreover, their study revealed that at-large elections had no influence on manager tenure 
either. Such findings are of considerable interest in the context of this article, as they 
address not only factors such as at-large elections on management tenure, but also 
community characteristics, such as population.  Feiock and Stream discovered that the 
effect population had on tenure was small, but the proportion of the population below 
poverty level was associated with increased tenure (Feiock & Stream, 1998). 
In addition to their findings, Feiock & Stream brought a concept to the academic 
discussion of city manager tenure that is seldom heard, yet significant to the overall set of 
issues at hand.  While the tradition of professional city managers assumes that long 
tenure is associated with greater expertise and professionalism, not all would agree that 
longer tenure for public managers is necessarily desirable. Shorter tenures might even 
enhance administrative responsiveness (Frederickson, 1995). 
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However, so much other research demonstrates that low tenure can be very 
detrimental, and it appears that the advantages of longer tenure far outweigh the 
disadvantages (Svara, 1998).  One reason for this is that, as mentioned earlier, high 
turnover of city managers, and the period of vacancy between managers in a community 
greatly sacrifice the executive leadership needed to maintain professionalism and bring 
an administrative buffer between politics and the budget (Kraemer, 1977).  Additionally, 
high turnover is a major detractor for a new generation of candidates for the profession, 
as demonstrated in research provided earlier.   Even if the current pool of managers were 
to continue to rotate every few years between communities, that pool will eventually 
retire, and in order to instill the institutional memory of the profession, concerns about 
new candidates refraining from entering the profession need to be addressed.  The signs 
of this problem are already taking form in the large number of vacancies for the city 
manager position in Oklahoma. 
  Although several opinions as to the cause for low tenure among city managers 
have been discussed, the most promising source of data on this cause, the city managers 
themselves, has not yet been given due examination.  Numerous studies have been 
discussed regarding the effects of population size, mayor-manager relationships, political 
representation structure, etc.  However, this research has not yet fully explored the 
possibility that principal-agent theory, as it has been applied to municipal government, 
adversely affects tenure among city managers.  
The research that does currently exist has only addressed fractions of the larger 
problem, which in actuality is the cause for many of these smaller problems.  The 
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theoretical framework, in which municipal government has developed, that is, through its 
own adaptation of principal-agent theory, is the greatest challenge to the tenure of city 
managers.  This hypothesis will be evaluated by surveying those that have the most to 
gain or lose on this subject; the city managers themselves.  
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METHODS 
Recent research has suggested that the population size of a community has a 
major affect on city manager tenure.  It has been argued that the larger the population, the 
lower the attrition rate for city managers (Feiock et al., 1998).  While such results may 
have validity in many states (such as the findings of Feiock et al. (1998) for the state of 
Florida), in Oklahoma, the same conclusions cannot so easily be made.  Evidence for this 
can be observed by reviewing the tenure for the past 5 city managers/town administrators 
in 15 communities randomly selected in the state of Oklahoma, all with widely differing 
population sizes.  To obtain this data, city hall offices were contacted and a city clerk or 
current serving city manager was contacted for each community.  We hypothesized that 
the population size of a community has no significant affect on city manager tenure in 
Oklahoma.  Table 1. in the Results section of this article demonstrates what each 
community interviewed reported. 
To address the argument that low city manager tenure is the result of salaries not 
comparable to their work load, we collected data from the International City Managers 
Association for the mean salary of city managers.  We also gathered salaries for Scout 
Executives with the Boy Scouts of America from public accessible Form 990s.  To 
examine the mean tenure for Scout Executives, the human resources department was 
contacted and asked the tenure for each Scout Executive in the Southern Region for that 
organization. 
The Boy Scouts of America organizational structure is broken up into several 
geographic regions.  These regions span several states within the United States, and each 
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region is subordinate to a national headquarters based in Texas.  Scout Executives serving 
Oklahoma are located in what is known by the Boy Scouts of America as the Southern 
Region.   
In addition to Oklahoma, the Southern Region includes twelve other states; Texas, 
Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Virginia.  Serving in this region are 93 Councils, 
each having a Scout Executive.  I hypothesize that the mean salaries of city managers 
would be similar to the mean salaries of Scout Executives of the Boy Scouts of America 
and that despite these similarities, the mean tenure for Scout Executives in the Southern 
Region of the Boy Scouts of America would be higher than the mean tenure for city 
managers. 
For the purpose of this paper, I also wanted to determine what factors, other than 
population size, would affect a city manager’s decision to continue serving in a 
community.  In an effort to discover what issues contribute to low tenure among city 
managers in the profession, a survey was designed and sent to 185 city managers/town 
administrators in the state of Oklahoma.  The survey consisted of 7 questions that asked 
city managers/town administrators how strongly they agreed with a set of factors 
suggested in the academic literature to have a significant effect on city manager tenure.  
On a scale of 1 to 5, city managers serving in communities within the state of Oklahoma 
were asked to report how strongly they agreed with statements expressing each factor.   
City managers who strongly disagreed that the presence of a listed factor had an 
effect on their job were asked to circle the number corresponding to the degree of their 
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disagreement, with the number 1 being in strongest disagreement.  Those who strongly 
agreed that the presence of a listed factor had an affect on their job were asked to circle 
the number corresponding to the degree of their agreement, with the number 5 being in 
strongest agreement.  The 7 items addressed the following factors: council-manager 
relationships, the presence of ward or district-based representation, political/professional 
malfeasance committed by elected officials, the presence of unions, budget constraints, 
low city manager salaries, and the frequency of political quarrels among elected officials 
and/or community residents. 
In addition to the aforementioned 7 items, city managers/town administrators 
were asked to provide demographic information on 6 items.  The requested demographic 
information included, the city manager/town administrator’s age, the population of the 
city or town in which they currently serve, how long they had served in their current 
position, how long they had served in the city management profession in general, a 
description of the town’s council (at-large, district/ward, or other), and finally, gender.  
The respondents were notified in the survey that all answers were to be kept confidential.   
Along with the survey, the city managers/town administrators were provided with 
a return-addressed stamped envelope for the respondents to return the surveys once they 
were completed.  The business addresses of the city manager/town administrators of 
Oklahoma were provided for by the Oklahoma Municipal League.   
For this portion of the study, I hypothesized that council-manager relationships 
would have a significant effect on a city manager’s decision to continue working in a 
community, regardless of population size.  As I posit that principal-agent theory, as it has 
been applied to municipal government, places a city manager in an unfair dependency on 
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the political whims of a mayor and/or city council, we believe that a city manager’s 
relationship with the council will have the most significant effect on his/her tenure as a 
manager.   
I hypothesized that city managers will report that salary has not had a significant 
effect on their decision to continue serving in a community.  Moreover, I hypothesized 
that other by-products of principal-agent theory as applied to municipalities, such as 
managers who have endured political quarrels between residents and/or elected officials, 
experienced political or professional malfeasances perpetrated by an elected official, or 
struggled with the presence of union representatives will have significant effects on their 
tenure as a manager.  Finally, I hypothesized that gender, budgetary constraints, and the 
presence of unions will not significantly affect city manager tenure as the factors 
aforementioned that are by-products of principal-agent theory as it has been applied to 
municipal management. A copy of the survey sent to city managers/town administrators 




 The initial portion of our study began with an observation of the tenure for the 
past 5 city managers/town administrators in 15 communities randomly selected in the 
state of Oklahoma, all comprised of widely differing population sizes.  As stated before, 
this data was collected through city clerk interviews.  The data covers city manager 
tenure for 56 city managers who have served within the past 30 years in the state of 
Oklahoma.   
Via a frequency distribution, Table 1 indicates that, from the sampled tenure for 
city managers, city managers more frequently served less than 7 years in a community.  
The mean tenure for the city managers sampled was 4.93 years.  From this data, it 
appears that mean tenure for city managers in Oklahoma falls under both the 5.4 years 
national tenure in 1989 and the 6.9 years in 2006 as reported by Morgan et al. (1999, 
2006). 
Table 1. 
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As Table 2 demonstrates, in 4 of the randomly selected communities, not all 
tenure could be provided for the past 5 city managers.  In each instance, this was due to 
the fact that either the city hall did not keep employee records far enough back to provide 
the requested information.  Table 2 indicates this incomplete data with the abbreviation 
‘N/A.’ 
Table 2. 











Woodward 11931 4 years 5.5 years 9 years 5 years 4.5 years 
Wanette 418 4 years  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tecumseh 6490 4 years 1 year 7 years 10 years  N/A 
Drumright 2877 4 months 6 years 14 months 5 years 3 years 
Glenpool 8960 1 year 2 years N/A N/A N/A 
Mustang 15887 5 years 6 years 1.5 years N/A N/A 
Konowa 1434 3 weeks 2 years 5 months 13 years 2 years 
Guthrie 10800 1 year 4 years >1 year >1 year >1 year 
Tahlequah 16075 8 years 10 years 2 years 4 years N/A 
Midwest City 54890 2 years 21 years 1 year 4.5 years 1 year 
Kingfisher 4501 2 years 16 months 1 year 2 years 11 years 
Elk City 10743 14 years  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Enid 46416 9 months 2 years 4 years  N/A N/A 
  
most recent 




Table 2 additionally indicates that population size is not a major factor on tenure 
for city managers in Oklahoma.  These findings support the findings of Feiock and 
Stream (1998) that population size is not a significant factor. 
From the research demonstrated in tables 1 and 2, not only can it be seen that the 
average tenure for a city manager is low in Oklahoma, regardless of community 
population, but tenure has been a problem in Oklahoma for at least 30 years.  Table 1 
suggests that city manager tenure is low in Oklahoma, and Table 2 suggests that 
regardless of population size, communities in Oklahoma tend to have low manager tenure.  
Table 2 additionally suggests that low tenure is not limited to recent managers, because 
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the past 5 managers for each community tend to have similar tenure.  It should also be 
noted that several of the respondents reported that between these city managers listed in 
the data were several interim city managers who filled in vacancies until a city manager 
could be hired, and some communities would leave the position vacant for a year or more 
at a time.   
From these findings, it can be observed that municipal management is not 
achieving the end it had set out to accomplish; to create a politically-neutral agent to aid 
citizens in governing a city.  What it has caused is a false sense of fairness and justice, 
and even this illusion has lost its allure, as demonstrated by the lack of interest in the city 
management profession (Broder, 1972; DeSantis & Newell, 1996).   
According to data gathered from Federal Form 990 forms that non-profit 
organizations such as the Boy Scouts of America must make accessible, it is possible to 
record the average of the 2005 reported salaries of every Scout Executive serving 
Oklahoma.  This mean salary was $99,321.  The mean score of City Managers in 
Oklahoma, using data collected in 2005 from the International City Management 
Association, was $92,472 (ICMA, 2005).  With these observations the parallels in salary 
compensation are established, and it therefore becomes important to examine whether 
Scout Executive tenure is differs from city manager tenure. 
  To measure for tenure of Scout Executives, the human resources department for 
the Boy Scouts of America was contacted.  The human resources department provided 
the tenure of every Scout Executive currently serving in the Southern Region.  It should 
be noted that the data provided was specifically for the tenure of the employee serving in 
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the Scout Executive position, not their entire tenure working for the Boy Scouts of 
America. 
The dataset tracks the number of Scout Executives in the Southern Region who 
have served in the position of Scout Executive for 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, etc. 
consecutively to the longest tenured Scout Executives in the Southern Region, 22 years.  
The data provided by the human resources department is summarized in a frequency 
distribution in Table 3 below: 
Table 3. 
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 Out of the 93 total Scout Executives serving in the Southern organizational region 
of the Boy Scouts of America, mean tenure for those executives was 8.20 years.  Table 3 
indicates a more even distribution for Scout Executive Tenure than Table 2 indicated for 
city manager tenure.  When comparing the average tenure of Oklahoma city managers 
and Scout Executives, we find that the mean tenure for Scout Executives is nearly twice 
as long than city managers in Oklahoma.  Additionally, it is worth noting the human 
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resources department for the Boy Scouts of America reported that of the 93 Scout 
Executive positions in the Southern Region, only 7 Executives left the position in 2007, 
13 Executives left in 2006, and 19 changed in 2005.  Many of these brief vacancies, the 
human resources department reported, were due to those Executives moving into 
retirement.  Moreover, it should be noted that the human resources department reported 
no vacancies in the Southern Region for the position of Scout Executive at the time of 
their report.  Compared to the more than 60 vacancies for the position of City Manager in 
Oklahoma as reported by the Oklahoma Municipal League, the numbers of Boy Scout 
vacancies is much lower. 
Regarding my survey that was sent to 185 city managers/town administrators 
measuring the significance of the effect of 7 factors on manager tenure, 57 of those city 
managers/town administrators responded to the survey.    At first glance, a respondent 
rate of 30.8 percent appears to be a limitation to results of my survey.  However the 
mailing list of city managers used was from the current city managers at the beginning of 
2007.  Considering the number of vacancies in Oklahoma city manager positions (more 
than 60) my respondent rate more closely approaches 45 percent; thus negating the 
limitations of this survey.  Table 4 provides a summarized view of how the respondents 
felt about the 7 factors.  Table 5 provides a summarized view of the percentages of the 
agreement among respondents for each factor.  The responses for each question are 






     
Table 4. 
1. My relationships 
with the City 
Council affect my 
decision to 
continue serving 
in my position. 
 










 Table 5. 
 
 
3. An act of 
political/professio
nal malfeasance 
perpetrated by an 
elected official has, 
on at least one 
occasion, affected 
my decision to 
continue serving 
in my position. 
 
4. The presence of 
unions makes my 
job more difficult. 
 
5. Budget constraints 
in my current 
position are more 
burdensome than I 
thought they would be. 
 
6. I frequently explore 
other opportunities due 
to low salary in my 
current position. 
 
7. Political quarrels among 












1 1 2 10 17 25 
Question 
2 13 16 18 5 3 
Question 
3 23 8 9 7 8 
Question 
4 18 6 12 5 14 
Question 
5 3 12 16 12 9 
Question 
6 21 6 11 8 9 
Question 
7 9 12 4 17 11 












1 .2% .4% 18.2% 30.9% 45.5% 
Question 
2 23.6% 29.1% 32.7% .9% .5% 
Question 
3 41.8% 14.5% 32.7% 12.7% 14.5% 
Question 
4 32.7% 11% 16.4% .9% 25.5% 
Question 
5 .73% 21.8% 29.1% 21.8% 16.4% 
Question 
6 38.2% 11% 20% 14.5% 16.4% 
Question 
7 16.4% 21.8% .7% 30.9% 20% 
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elected officials cause 


































 As demonstrated by Table 6, city managers/town administrators in Oklahoma 
have strong feelings about how manager-council relationships affect their tenure.  
Specifically, 45.5 percent of the city managers reported that they strongly agreed that 
council-manager relationships had an affect on their decision to continue working as a 
manger.  Another 30.9 percent of the respondents somewhat agreed that council-manager 
relationships affect tenure. 
 These results demonstrated the highest level of agreement among the survey 
items and support the findings of Morgan and England (1999).  However, it is also true 
that tenure in many professions hinges on an employees’ relationship with their co-
workers, and this could be applied to the city management profession, thus reducing the 
validity Conclusion. However, given the fact that so much research has already been 
presented demonstrating that conflict for city managers is a frequent result of political 
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biases, the results of my findings do add support for the notion that the failure of the 
politics/administration separation to persist affect tenure negatively. 
     Table 7. 




























 Table 7 demonstrates the level of agreement respondents had toward the presence 
of ward or district representation as a factor affecting manager tenure.  These findings 
showed that managers were typically neutral or more in disagreement with the concept 
that ward or district representation affects their tenure as a manager.  In fact, 85.4 percent 
of the respondents were neutral toward, or disagreed with ward or district representation 
as a factor influencing manager tenure.  These findings contradict the findings of Herman 
James (1914), whose work suggested ward or district representation was a factor. 
 Table 8 demonstrates the level of agreement among respondents regarding 
political malfeasance as a factor influencing tenure.  For this item on the survey, results 
were surprisingly low.  Only 27.2 percent of all respondents somewhat agreed or strongly 
agreed that an act of political malfeasance had at least on one occasion, affected their 
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tenure as a manager; the remaining 72.8 percent respondents were either neutral toward, 
or disagreed that political malfeasance had ever been a factor.  A possible explanation for 
these results could be that political malfeasance is rarely perpetrated by elected officials 
in the state of Oklahoma, but when it does occur, the act could still have a great effect on 
a manager’s tenure.  Yet again, there could be other explanations for these results.  For 
example, actions of malfeasance could be common in communities but go unnoticed by 
managers.  Another explanation could be that the manager is unaffected regardless of 
actions of malfeasance. 
Table 8. 





























The respondents answered with strong results when asked about the presence of 
unions having an affect on manager tenure.  As demonstrated in Table 9, respondents 
were mostly in strong agreement or disagreement over the issue.  32.7 percent of the 
respondents said that they strongly disagreed that unions were a factor in their tenure as a 
city manager.  25.5 percent of the respondents said they strongly agreed that unions were 
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a factor in their tenure as a manager.  Another 16.4 percent were neutral on the subject 
and the remaining 20 percent either somewhat agreed or disagreed with union presence as 
a factor.   
These findings may be open for interpretation, but suggest that in communities 
where city managers must work through union arbitration, the presence of unions 
significantly serves as a factor affecting manager tenure.  In communities where there are 
no unions, it seems obvious that union presence would have no effect on manager tenure.  
This argument is supported via remarks made during city manager interviews to discover 
tenure that was previously discussed in this article. 
Table 9. 



























 Table 10 demonstrates the results of the portion of my study examining factors 
outside of the control of the affects of the version of principal-agent theory applied to 
governments.  When asked if budget constraints were more burdensome than the city 
manager/town administrator had thought they would be before serving in their current 
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position, responses revealed that only .73 percent strongly disagreed, 21.8 percent 
somewhat disagreed, 29.1 percent were neutral, 21.8 percent somewhat agreed, and 16.4 
percent strongly agreed.  In sum, 38.2 percent of all respondents were at some level of 
agreement that budget constraints were more burdensome than they had thought would be.  
Such findings do not directly address my argument of weaknesses in principal-agent 
theory as it has been applied to municipal management, but they do suggest room for 
improvement in how city managers are prepared for the offices they are about to serve.   
Table 10. 




























When asked if they frequently explored other employment opportunities due to low 
salary in their current position, 38.2 percent of the respondents said that they strongly 
disagreed with that statement.  Surprisingly, more respondents were content with their 
current salary than were not.  Moreover, all communities but one responded they strongly 
agreed that low salary in their position has resulted in their decision to explore other 
employment opportunities were in communities with populations under 5,000.  These 
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findings did not support the work of George Floro (1955), which argued that city 
manager turnover was often due to the city manager’s own decision to advance in salary 
compensation.  This suggests that, while salary at one time may have been a factor in city 
manager tenure, it is not a significant factor for current city managers in the state of 
Oklahoma. 
 This supports my argument that principal-agent theory as it has been applied to 
local government is ineffective because smaller towns with smaller budgets for manager 
salaries suffer because they cannot typically hold onto a manager long enough to truly 
benefit from effective executive leadership.  Only under a new design, with more 
stringent regulations on salary and the movement of managers from one community to 
another, will smaller communities begin to recover from this disadvantage. 
Table 11. 




























Survey item 7 was perhaps the most directly related question to my argument that 
principal-agent theory as it has been applied to local governments is insufficient because 
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it fails to separate politics from administration of the budget.  Item 7 on the survey asked 
city managers/town administrators if politics frequently interfered with their ability to 
perform as an administrator.  Table 12 demonstrates the frequency distribution of the 
levels of agreement managers had with this statement. 
Table 12. 




























 As can be seen from Table 12 (as well as Table 5), 50.9 percent of the 
respondents to the survey agreed on some level that political quarrels among residents or 
elected officials cause frequent obstacles to their job as an administrator.  Only 16.4 
percent strongly disagreed with this issue, and surprisingly, all of these responses were 
from managers in communities with populations under 10,000.   
 The findings demonstrated in Table 12 reveal that politics and quarrels among 
elected officials and community residents are a significant problem that a significant 
number of managers must endure.  Moreover, these findings support those of Whitaker 
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and DeHoog (1991) which suggest that conflict in communities are a burden that has a 
significant affect on manager turnover in local governments. 
 In addition to the 7 survey items aforementioned, city managers/town 
administrators in Oklahoma were asked to provide demographic information that would 
help shed further light on the state of the city management profession.  One of the 
demographic items was gender, and the results of the manager responses to this item are 
presented in Table 13. 
Table 13. 
 
From Table 13, it can clearly be seen that the population of my sample of local 
government managers in Oklahoma is heavily populated by males.  The International 
City Manager’s Association reports that 95 percent of all city managers in the United 
States are male (Morgan and England, 1999).  Having 76.4 percent of the respondents in 
my survey to be male, Oklahoma appears to be slightly lower than that average at first 
glance.  Only 30 percent of all Oklahoma managers of local government responded to 




















this survey, however, so it is likely that the percentage of males is higher than Table 13 
reveals.  Still, 55 out of 185 respondents is a valid representative sample size, but 
regardless of this, these demographics indicate that there is little diversity in Oklahoma’s 
city management profession. 
Another demographic question posed in survey was the description of the 
respondents’ council form of government.  Respondents were given the choices of district 
representation, at-large representation, or other.   Their responses reveal that the majority 
(32, specifically) of local governments in Oklahoma have district representation (63.6 
percent of those who responded).  27.3 percent responded that their council was governed 
with at-large representation.  An additional 8 responses indicated that they used some 
other form of government in their municipality. 
Respondents were additionally asked to provide age demographics.  Of the 
respondents, only 3 fit in an age cohort of 20 to 40.  41 of the respondents, however, fit 
into an age cohort of 41 to 60, and 11 fit into an age cohort of 61 to 80. The responses 
reveal that very few managers employed are under the age of 40.  Such findings lend 
support to the argument that interest in the city management profession is dwindling.  
These findings also support those of Morgan and England (1999) that the majority of city 




From the research conducted in this article, several results provided support for 
the hypotheses posed.  As predicted, my hypothesis that factors resulting from the 
shortcomings of principal-agent theory applied to city management, such as political 
interference and council-manager conflict, affect the tenure of city managers in 
Oklahoma. I was surprised to discover that some factors I hypothesized to have an affect 
on manager tenure, such as ward presence and acts of political malfeasance perpetrated 
by elected officials, did not produce significant results.  One again however, the factor of 
acts of political malfeasance may be explained away by the fact that it occurs rarely in the 
communities who responded to my survey. Moreover, my hypothesis that salary would 
not be a significant factor in manager tenure was supported.  Also, my hypothesis that 
Scout Executives would have a higher tenure than city managers was supported. 
Overall, this study has demonstrated that the aging population of city managers in 
the population, with few successors in the work pool, factors caused by the faults of 
principal-agent theory (as applied to municipal management), and a lack of preparation 
for city managers regarding the burdens of their workload are all painting a bleak picture 
for the future of the profession.  It is clear that manager-council relations affect tenure 
and that conflict is a frequent occurrence in this turbulent relationship. 
Based on information provided in the current academic dialogue of city 
management, it appears that along with Oklahoma, and more than ever, cities throughout 
the United States are increasingly finding their city management positions vacant 
(Kammerer, Farris, DeGrove, & Clubok, 1962).  Those with graduate degrees in Public 
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Administration or related fields are turning to non-profit organizations or elsewhere in the 
private sector, whereby they can do the same type of work as a city manager, but with 
fewer headaches from civic political anguish.  
There are many who argue that America’s educational system is not training 
students with degrees in public administration or related fields to become city managers.  
In Oklahoma, the average age of a city manager is 54.  As was demonstrated, soon an 
entire generation of those serving in this profession will be retiring, leaving a substantial 
void in the occupation.  With such an occupational vacuum looming on the horizon, the 
crisis will develop on a short-term scale; and the long-term solution of education reform 
in universities will fail to address the problem in time.   
Moreover, even if programs were put in place in universities to train students to 
become functioning city managers, they would still lack vital experience needed to 
effectively manage a municipality in time for the current city managers in office to retire.  
Presumably, something more must be done to correct this situation.  Job candidates of the 
future for the city management profession will require more long term training than a 
four year university or 2 year graduate program can offer; and such training needs to 
address short-term needs.   
Of course, the International City Managers Association has been devoted to 
producing resource materials since 1934 in an effort to train professionals to perform 
better city management, but the approaching dilemma in the profession will not be solved 
simply by the presence of these materials (Banovetz, 1995).  There needs to be a more 
“hands on” approach to handling the new wave of city managers that will enter the 
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profession in coming years.  This approach will require mentorship from a supervisory 
body that can help guide this oncoming population of inexperienced managers; and this 
supervisory body will need the freedom from politics to effectively train the new 
generation of administrators. 
The most optimal training environment to sufficiently prepare a new generation of 
city managers would provide continued resources and guidance for the professional as 
they are engaged in their career.  More simply stated, the city managers of the future, 
with all of their inexperience are going to require a central organization capable of 
fostering the necessary mentorship to allow them to operate as effective city managers.  
Thus, if the city management profession is to survive, a new model for its existence must 
replace this current model that is based on governmental adaptations of principal-agent 
theory. 
At least one group of scholars agrees with this opinion. Richard Feiok and 
Christopher Stream likewise agree that the use of employment agreements influences 
tenure but in an intervening, rather than additive, manner. They concluded that the 
structure of employment institutions is important not only because it may structure 
personal incentives, but because it may also either insulate the manager from conflict in 
the community or propel him or her to the center of such conflict (Feiock & Stream, 
1998).  The key is to create a structure that insulates the manager from political conflict. 
One possible solution to this dilemma can be found in the organizational structure 
of a profession that is luring many qualified professionals away from municipal 
management-the non-profit industry.  Like local governments, non profit organizations 
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are governed by a partnership between volunteers and employed professionals.  Unlike 
city governments however, non profit organizations are not structured to follow principal-
agent theory in the same manner as the city management industry, and retention rates are 
much higher (Droege and Hoobler, 2003; Paul, 1981; Kearney and Scavo, 2001). To gain 
further understanding on how the structure of non profits operate and what the municipal 
management profession can benefit from them, it is important to examine the mechanics 
of one of the more successful and efficient non profit organizations in the United States; 
The Boy Scouts of America. 
Within each regional headquarters that covers a geographic area of a state, or 
Council of the Boy Scouts of America professional organization, there are several staffed 
employees that function similarly to a city manager.  At the lowest level of management 
in a Council is a District Executive, who typically serves to coordinate with volunteers to 
prepare an annual budget, coordinates program activities to be conducted, and recruits 
persons to specialize in the areas of finance, activity program, membership growth, and 
unit consultation to chartered partners in the district of which he/she serves. 
Like a city manager, the District Executive attends and functions in accordance 
with a committee; in municipal management this committee is the city council, in the 
Scouting organizational structure, this committee is called a District Committee.  Aside 
from the names, their functions are no different. In both committee and council, policy is 
evaluated and voted upon, finances are discussed secured through grants, contributions, 
etc., and strategic plans are implemented to ensure the growth and longevity of the 
respective organizations served. In addition to this committee, both the city manager and 
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the District Executive functions in conjunction with a Commissioner Corps, a civic 
volunteer base that provides service to the geographic regions they represent. 
Unlike a city manager however, who serves only one community, a District 
Executive serves multiple communities, and most frequently, several counties.  In this 
geographic area, most civic clubs such as Rotary International, or Kiwanis, some schools, 
most churches, police departments, and fire department hold charters to a functioning 
Boy Scout troop.  In this respect, the District Executive carries more of a workload as 
he/she is accountable for the progress of the Scouting movement of every citizen in each 
one of those communities he/she serves; a potentially more politically pressured climate 
than a city manager position. 
Moreover, like a city manager, the District Executive works alongside an elected 
official; for the city manager this official is the Mayor; for the District Executive- a 
District Chairman.  Both positions function similarly, but it is their relevance in the 
hierarchy of the overall organization that will provide the element vital to the success of 
the city manager profession adopting the Boy Scout District Executive model.  This will 
be further explained shortly. 
Superior to the District Executive is a Field Director, who is charged with the 
same responsibilities and duties as a district executive, only this position services several 
districts in a region known as a ‘service area.’  The Field Director coordinates with the 
same committee groups as a District Executive and a city manager, only these 
committees are referred to as a ‘service area committee’ and a ‘service area 
commissioner corps.’   
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Finally, presiding over all of these Boy Scout professionals is a Scout Executive, 
who coordinates with the same committees aforementioned, but at the council level, or 
the level that encompasses all of the districts in the council.  All of the aforementioned 
Scouting professional positions carry similar duties to a city manager; however it is the 
Scout Executive’s salary that is most similar on average to that of a city manager, so it is 
this position that is most suitable for comparison with the retention rates of a city 
manager.  Similarities among Scout executives and city managers have already been 
previously addressed in this article, so they will not be again described in detail here.  
However, it is worth reiterating that surprisingly, the Scout Executive position has a 
much higher retention rate than the city manager (Klinger, Nalbandian, and Romzek, 
2002).   
So if Scout Executives and city managers have similar job duties and salaries, 
why such a vast difference in occupational retention?  In part this is due to the role of the 
aforementioned Mayor/District Chairman position in the Scouting organization.  At the 
Council level, the elected District Chairman is referred to as a ‘Council President,’ yet as 
before, these positions are the same, merely differing in their titles.  What differs, 
however, is that if the district or council committee, the volunteers, or the elected 
officials have an issue with the Scouting professional, they cannot simply host a meeting 
and fire the professional without warning. 
Even if any of these branches of the Scouting organization wish to remove a 
Scout Executive from employment, they must first file grievances with or consult a 
higher authority; at the District Executive level-with the Scout Executive; at the Scout 
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Executive level-with a Regional Director who presides over several states and Councils.  
Under the Boy Scout Executive model, nothing escapes a rigorous system of checks and 
balances.  The city manager however is not so fortunate. 
As has been demonstrated in the aforementioned case studies, if a Mayor or a city 
council have an issue with a city manager, for whatever motive, this group of untrained 
volunteers have no higher authority to file grievances with or to consult before making 
the rash decision of firing a city manager; making for a highly unstable market of job 
security; not to mention leaving a leadership void within the community.  In a word, there 
is no sure way to know if a city manager is being fired for the right reasons by competent 
employers, and there is no one out there providing a foundation to his/her job security.  
Principal-agent theory as it has been applied to municipal management is not only 
insufficient, it is unethical. 
An additional reason for such higher retention rates could be the continued 
training a Scout Executive receives.  By the time a Scout Executive takes his/her position, 
she has had no less than three and as much as 20 years working experience as a District 
Executive, Field Director, etc.  Moreover, the training for the Scout Executive position 
does not stop at their work experience.  The Scout Executive also has a regional body of 
the organization to report to that provides mentorship and training to the professional. 
A more viable solution would be to follow something similar to the Boy Scout 
Executive model.  This model could be made applicable to the municipal management 
profession by placing all city managers under the jurisdiction of one state-central entity.  
For the sake of this article, this entity will be called the State Department of Municipal 
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Services (SDMS).  The SDMS would recruit, train, and provide technical and human 
resources support to the City Managers of each community.  Additionally, under such a 
model, the city manager would function more as a consultant to a community, free from 
the political web that so frequently plagues the profession today.  For the sake of 
applying a title to the correct job duties, the city manager position might be renamed as a 
City Operations Consultant. 
It may be argued that under such a model, citizens of a community would be less 
empowered because an outside source would be governing a community.  This 
supposition however is erroneous for two reasons.  The first is that under this system the 
community’s representatives, the commissioners and/or the city council, could vote 
whether or not their community chooses to participate in this program.  Because the 
community has full authority in choosing whether or not it participates in the program, 
municipal government will remain a democratic process.  So as to not face this new 
program with the same problems the city management profession current endures, 
namely the high attrition rate, once a community votes to implement the program and 
make use of the SDMS, it will be imperative that the community signs a ten year 
partnership agreement with the SDMS.   
The ten year commitment will give the community sufficient time to make 
necessary adjustments in their community to fit the new management system and it will 
ensure that those serving as City Operations Consultants will have at the very least a ten 
year job security incentive.  Even if the City Operations Consultant is not a good match 
for the community after a trial period a new City Operations Consultant can immediately 
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replace the first and the City Operations Consultant who was replaced can be relocated by 
the SDMS to another community that is a better fit for them.  Once a City Operations 
Consultant serves in a community beyond the trial period, the consultant is ‘locked in’ to 
that community and if said community has any problems with this consultant, they would 
then have to refer to the grievance system previously mentioned before the SDMS would 
act to relocate the employee. 
The second reason ensures that communities who have voted to participate, or 
subscribe to the City Management program will not lose empowerment once under its 
operation.  Under this model the City Operations Consultant would be employed by the 
state central entity, but the service he/she provides would be owned by the community.  
The City Operations Consultant would only be a consultant to assist the community in 
municipal operations.  If the citizens of the community felt like their voices were not 
heard, or that the City Operations Consultant was not acting in their best interests, the 
community would have a few options to remedy their issue. 
Their first option would be to file a grievance with the state-central entity that 
hires the City Operations Consultant.  In this case, the entity would investigate the issue, 
and if warranted, would issue a written reprimand or terminate the City Operations 
Consultant, depending on the degree of malfeasance.  Another option would be for the 
citizens of the community to opt out of receiving the services of the City Operations 
Consultant, conducting their own business through a local Mayor.  In this case, the City 
Operations Consultant would not be terminated from employment, but relocated to 
another community within the state. 
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In addition to providing more job security to the City Operations Consultant, less 
politicizing of the profession, and a more specialized facilitator to the community, this 
new model would allow the opportunity for City Operations Consultants throughout the 
state to meet, share ideas, and collaborate to ensure that positive growth is occurring in 
each community within the state.  Such organization would have profound implications 
for both rural and urban communities struggling to deal with global outsourcing that has 
become detrimental to their job market.  Moreover, this new model would place more 
accountability on the City Operations Consultant to help move the community in a 
successful direction because he/she would have a supervisor to report to on the 
community’s progress at the state level. 
Such a concept is neither radical nor completely original.  There are many 
instances in municipal governments throughout the United States where state government 
is taking on a more active role in local administration. The Municipal Yearbook reports 
that since the 1930s, when the Great Depression threatened the future of so many 
communities, many states have imposed their own financial control on local communities 
(Berman, 2007).  Widely respected authority on State and Local government relations, 
David Berman suggests that the depression led many states to adopt similar controls over 
municipalities as proposed in this article.  He writes: 
[The depression] also gave birth to the idea of giving a state agency complete 
control over the financial management of all municipalities; although this actually 
occurred only in a few states where municipal default had been extensive.  Among 
powers given to state agencies in these places-of which New Jersey was one-were the 
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authority to review local budgets before their adoption and to order changes to avoid a 
deficit (Berman, 2007). 
Berman additionally cites that North Carolina and Ohio have given such authority 
over local municipalities to state agencies and believes that such policies enable the state 
to prevent local governments from falling into financial distress, allow a better system of 
monitoring whereby problems can be corrected early on, and it eases the anxieties of 
investors when rating municipal bonds (Berman, 2007).  Such a policy has been 
demonstrated to work well in some states, but democracy suffers somewhat as control is 
taken away from the citizens of the community.  A better approach would be the system 
suggested in this article, whereby the state has more control, but the citizens are still 
empowered with the right to elect whether or not they participate in the program, and can 
still provide feedback to the State Department of Municipal Services regarding the City 
Operations Consultant that has been assigned to their community. 
Philip Kloha, noted academician in the field of municipal management writes, 
“there has been a gradual but steady expansion of state involvement in local affairs 
during the 20th century” (Kloha, 2005).  Moreover, as Kloha writes: 
The state’s stake in possible local financial difficulty is huge.  When local 
governments experience severe fiscal distress, they may be unable to make timely 
payments to bondholders, vendors, and/or employees.  Significant cutbacks in public 
services such as libraries, parks, recreation, and even police or fire often result, creating 
a very visible and undesirable situation.  This reduction in service levels often comes at a 
time when local tax rates are being increased in an attempt to generate sufficient revenue 
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to deal with the financial difficulties, which only makes the locality more unattractive in 
terms of public services and tax burden to current as well as potential residents and 
businesses.  Surrounding areas are sometimes then forced to compensate in service 
delivery by extending their coverage to the distressed community…(Kloha, 2005). 
By changing the city management structure to the one proposed in this article, 
surrounding communities will not be so burdened by struggling communities.  By 
producing a state central city management system, communities can be sure that their 
service delivery will not suffer due to managerial vacuums left in the wake of political 
malfeasance by elected and less-qualified officials. 
And often times, the elected officials involved in local governments have been 
insufficiently qualified to handle such issues. Numerous noted academicians in the field 
of Public Administration have confirmed this statement.  Among these, Nancy Roberts, 
addressed the topic in an article in which she writes, “[professional managers] have the 
education, skills, and time to devote to policy concerns.  In contrast, citizens lack the 
special training and resources needed to be cogent about complex policy problems, 
especially those involving highly sophisticated technology,” (Roberts, 2004).   
Richard Kearney and Scavo concur with Roberts as they write that although local 
legislative bodies hold the final authority with respect to ordinances and a host of other 
important decisions, including the hiring and firing of the city manager, in council-
manager cities, they are often poorly equipped to address complex administrative and 
fiscal issues (Kearney & Scavo, 2001).  Kearney and Scavo’s argument was that because 
of this inexperience, the citizen representatives often defer to the wishes of the manager 
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or mayor on policy.  Under such circumstances, this is bad government and yet another 
testament as to why the current dichotomy of principals and agents in municipal 
management is no longer the best way to govern them. 
 There are many mechanical issues that need to be addressed before implementing 
the revolutionary measure toward municipal management that would involve state agency 
involvement such as the State Department of Municipal Services, and one of the most 
significant of these is funding.  (Morgan and England, 1999, pp. 25-27; O’Toole, 1999; 
Martin, 1990). 
  However this new model has significant potential in virtually every aspect of the 
profession; for both the professional and the community.  Here it was not intended draw 
the blueprint for a new city management system, but to stir the conversation in a new 
direction, because it is evident that the current application of principal-agent theory is not 
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Appendix: City Manager/Town Administrator Survey 
 
Please take two or three minutes to complete this survey.  On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “strongly 
disagree” and 5 being “strongly agree,” we ask for your feelings about how these factors affect you as 
a city manager/town administrator.  All responses are kept confidential.  We also ask for demographic 
information at the end of the survey, and that you return this page in the envelope provided.  Thank 
you for helping us in this important study. 
 
8. My relationships with the City Council affect my decision to continue serving in my position. 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 
  Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
 
9. The presence of ward or district-based representation makes my job more difficult. 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 
  Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
 
10. An act of political/professional malfeasance perpetrated by an elected official has, on at least one 
occasion, affected my decision to continue serving in my position. 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 
  Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
 
11. The presence of unions makes my job more difficult. 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 
  Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
 
12. Budget constraints in my current position are more burdensome than I thought they would be. 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 
  Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
 
13. I frequently explore other opportunities due to low salary in my current position. 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 
  Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
 
14. Political quarrels among community residents or elected officials cause frequent obstacles for me. 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 
  Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
 
What is your age?______   
 
What is the population of the city/town?______ 
 
How long have you been in your current position?______   How long in the profession? _______ 
 
Please indicate the appropriate description of your Council: __ At-large; __District/ward; __Other.  
 
Gender (circle one):     Male     Female   
